Summary account and degree of convergence of the economic policies pursued in the member countries in 1974. (Submitted to the Council by the Commission in accordance with Articles 2 and 12 of the Council Decision of 18 February 1974). COM (76) 81 final, 3 March 1976 by unknown
tI
a
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
o0:i(?6) Br final.
Brussela, J March 1976.
su!$LARY ACCoINT At{D DEGI1E 0E C0$\I]r,RGTICE__OF _TI{lt ECON0}.[I_q
._
POIICIES PtJRSiIil nI Sm !'!t1Bgn C0'"lIRi.ilS ff 1975
(Sulmitted. to the Council by the Connission in accordance with
Articles 2 ancl 12 of the Counci]. Decision of 18 February 1974)
co:{(?6) 81 final.
CONTMfTS
FOREITORD
A. rHE EC0N0ilIIC PoLTCTES OF {EE m[3In STATBS ff 1q?5
L The economic context
ff . Brrclgetary policy
fff. Monetary policy
fV. bcchange-rate policy
V. hiees and incomes policy
Fase
1
2
2
5
B
11
14
16
15
1g
B.
vr.
VIT.
CO}NTER.GHICII OF ECONOIIIIC POLTCIES IN TIIE COMI{UNTIY
Application of the Council
Conforrnity of the policies
a^nd success of the efforts
w'ithin the Comm:nity.
Decision of 18 February 1974
pnrsued. nith the objectives sett
at coord.ination undertaken
CONCLUSIONS 2?.
-1-
FORE}TORI)
Together with its Comunication on the ad.justnent of the economic
policy guitlelines for 1976r the Conmission herewith subnits to the Cor:ncil
a report on the eoononic policies pursuecl in the Menber States last year.
In so doingt the Comiesion is acting in accordance with Article 2 of the
Council llecision of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high d.egree of
converg€nce of the econonic policies of the Menber States of the European
Eoononic Commrnity.
At the sa.ne time the report tlescrlbes, in accordanrce with Article 12
of the above raentioned. Decision, the appl.ication of this Decision during 1975
a,nd. assesses the confornity of the policies pursued. with the objectives set.
Ttre report will also be transnitted. to the European Farl.ianent.
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A. THE ECol[oMrC PoLTCIES otr THE MB{BER STA1ES IN 1975
I. lhg_egononic contert
1.1. fbc hber.stateg were conflorted by an urnrsually sariors cha-llcnge
at the begC.nntag of L)lJ1 they had, at the sane time to'oonbat both unmploy-
nent ancl inflatioa and. aleoe in oertaia oaE€sr to rsduoe large-soale balanoe of
paJnnents deficits. The effects of stagflation hacl reached. proportions which
were without prececlent in the post-uar years. Divergences in eoonmio rterrclop-
uent in the nenber corurtrieE had. n6vBr been greater since the establlsbnent of
the E\ropean Oonrunity and. even threatened. its cobesion.
'1.2. !y the end. of 1974t the rise in consumer prices for the Conmrxrity
as a whole had. accelerated. to reach an anrnral rate of 14 f". Tbe spread. in
the annual grow'th rates betreen the nenber cor:ntries $ras from 5 to 25 fi.
The balance of paynents d.lseguilibria of the Menber States had also reached
unusuaL proportions. The curent acount surplus of the surplus cor:ntries in
the Coniururity (Fecleral Republic of Gernarly, the Netherland.s, Belgiun a"nd.
Inrenbourg) anor:nted to $ 'tZ OOO nillion in 1974, while the cument account
tLeficit of the cLeficit countries totaLl-eel $ z5 ooo nillion.
1.3. Donestic and foreign d.enand hacl cleclined nore and. nore sharply
cluring 1974 ana in the second. haLf of the yrear had. resulteil in a worLilrricle
recession which affected. all the Conrunity cor.mtries, although to rrarying
d.egrees. The sh.rmp in inclustrial output very quuickly led. to a d.eterioration
in the labour rnarket situation. At the begir:ning of 1975t the seasonally
adjusted number of unenployed. in the Comrunity totalled approxinately l.f
nillion, or sone I f" of the working population. rn nost of the member
countriesr the r:nenplolment rate r*as close to this average figure, the only
significant exceptions being rreLa,nd. (f/") ana tr:xenbourg (a.If").
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1.4. The probLems and cLifficulties involved in conbatting r:nenploJfnent
and. inflation were common to aLl the nember countries, but there were extrenely
wicle ttifferences in the initial sitr:ation between the slenber cor:ntries. llhe
reasons for this incluiLe: ilifferences in the tining and. i-ntensity of the
counter.-inflation and. restrictive policies introduced. in previous years,
clifferences in the extent of the conflict between the trvo sid.es cf inclustry
on the clistribution of incone, clifferences in the clegree of d.epend.ence on
enerry and. raw naterial inports ancL in the trencl of erchange ratesl and
d.ifferences in the fina"ncial positions of firms ancl the public sector. The
considerable d.ivergences which becane apparent between the Member States at
the beginning of 1975t particularly the rate of inflation and the balance of
pa;6nents situationl lirnited. in varying degrees the scope for nanoeurEe j-n
economic policy in the d.ifferent Menber States.
1.5. Ttre economic policy gr:.id.e11nes for 1)lJ were basecL on the principle
that the nhort-term eoonoi.o polloy of tbe def;loit and. surplus oourtries of the
Gonuunity shouLd. oupleuent oare anotherrso as to be abLE to nEet the oballengps
on a basle of joint goLida,ni.ty (f).Tbe surplus oourrtr{.es were to intensify aa far
as possibLe their reflationary measuresr so as to stirnuLater th:ough increasecl
inports, econornic activity in the other member cor:ntries. fhe cl.eficit countriest
on the other ha,ncLl were to naintain their restrictive policies, to inoreage thelr
eff,orts to contain cost a.rd. prioe inflrtionr and as for na.intaining econmic
aotivity to regtnLot thenselveg to epeclfic nea,$lres.
1.6. Contrary to expectations, the econonic d.ornrswing d.icL not gradually
botton out at the beginning of 1975t but worsened even firrther in the first
haLf of the year. Ttrere were several factors behincl this: the rapid. slunp
in world. trad.e; intensive stock recluction, restraint on the part of consurners
a;1cl the over"-cautious expa,nsionary policy of the srrrrplus cor:ntries. Under
(t ) See Annua,l Report on the Econonic Sitr:ation in the Cornrrunity for 1)lJ,
OJ C 149 of 28 November 1974t and. Cormunicatiorr on the acLjustrnent of
econonic policy guidelines for 1975t 0J L 162/13 of 2J Jwte 1)'lJ.
4the pressure of the ever d.eteriorating econonic andl employnmt situation and
on the reconnend.ation of the Comnission, nost of the nenber cor:ntries Later
introducecl. fi:rtherrefbtionary neasures. Only in the autu.ut of lllJ rlid
econonic reoovery ia the Connr:nity beg:in to roake itself felt.
It is against the background. of these economic d.evelopnents that
the econonic policy neasures which have been taken in the rrarious nember
eountrieE must be assessed..
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II. Buclgetary Po1icy
2.I. In all the lt{enber States, public hrd.gete exerted. a powerful
cornter-cyclical infLuence in 1975. llhis resulted. in part from the
operation of tbe
hrilt-in regulators : short fa1ls in tax reverue and social secrrity
contributions, on the one hand.rand. increased. transfer e4en*iture on
uneurploynent benefits or on subgialles ln tbe p,b1io
sector, on the other. In addition, there was tbe effect of discretiona"ry
meagpes taken in most of tbe ccuntries to $lstain or revive the econornJrt
witb the tining cbosen, in accordance with tbe guitlelines laid down at
Cmrm:nity level, to take acccunt of the epecial featuree of the cycle in
eacb of the Member States. Tlnrs, tbe hrdgetary policy pursued in 1975
was, in most of tbe lrleqrber States, quite different in character from tbat
purnred. in 19?4r when the line was pred.omina,ntly cautiorer if not restrict-
ive. Ilhe onLy erceptions were lre1and and. the Unitecl Kingdomr where the
previcus, egra.nsionary, stance becarne stiil mole eq)ansior:ary. A11 in
all, public hrcl.gets in 1!Jl will' therefore, have nade a major contribrtion
to tiniting the ertent of the economic dwnttrrn in the Conmunity and to
speed.ing up its reversal.
2.2. 1[tre oba^ngeover to a stitrulatory hrdgetary policy bega^n firet in
Gerna.4r a^nd. the Netherlands. In Gema^r5r, this wag mainly reflected. in
the entry into force, on 1 Janrary I975r of a tax reform easing considerably
the burd.en of personaL incorne tax, and in a series of ebort-tern econornic
policy progralmes lalnched. between September }9?4 anit August L975 a"nd
ma;inly ctesignetl to raise the leve1 of lnvestment. In the lTetherland's toot
ae frogn autumn L974, the anthorities ad.opted. a series of hrdgetalTr meaBtlres
aimecl. at reviving econonlc activity, combining tax reliefs and. supplementary
expenctihpe intend.ed to generate or enccnrrage an upturn in investment and
enplo;rment. In BeLgium, a bud.getarXr etiruulue was provid.ed at an early
etage too, hrt it was more limited. in its objectives since it only involved
a3 appreciabLe lncrease in the public inveetment prog?ammes provid'ed' for
in the 19?5 hrdget. In tuxesrbourgr a progranme of special works in the
public interest las ailopted. in JuLy 1975.
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In Dennarkr bud.getary policy began to switch to a reflationar;r
rine in spiing 1975t in the initiaL bud.get for 1 915/76, and the new stance
uas strengthened- by ad.d.itional provisions acLopted. in June and. particularly
in Septercber 1)lJ. fn France, initial bucl-getary neasures to support economi-c
activityr involving in particular tax aids to producti.ve investnent,
were passed. in April 1975t but the main part of the reflationary plan r^ras
iatrodrrceel in Septenber; this took the forn of an amend.ing buiLget
involving'supplementary aid.s to families and. the aged., ihe extension of
tax payment dates and a special prog"anme for public and. industrial investnent.
2.3. rn rtalyr an initial programne of supplenentary expend.iture ldas
adopted" in May L975. f,hen in Arrgust a naJor pa,oka6e to
support the econouy ?'as brought in, aiming in particular, by means of bud-
getary tra^nsfers, at promoting exports, boosting activity in the builiiing
and construction industry and the public works sector, a.nd. stirqlating
investment in a nurnber of other sectors. fn freland., bud.getary policy for
1975 was initialLy airoed. at srrpporting the econony, princilnlly by means of e
sbarp inoreaEE in ourrent Oovorment expend.iturE.This polloy waa strengthcnad. in
June llJlr with the introduction, und.er supplenentary budget, of consuner
subsid-ies and acld-itional capital expend.iture. fn the United. Kingd.om the
1975h6 buclget also proviiLed for a marked. increase in expenditure, par-
ticularly current erpend.iture, producing an expansionary effect h'hich uas
onry slightry reduced. by increases in indirect taxation.
2.4. Ai-though the reflationary bud.getary measures introduced. in 1975
had. only a partial effect on bud.get lianagement during the year itself, par-
ticularly as regards expend.iture, they nevertheLess contributed appreciably
to the tend-ency tornerd.s d.eficits in public finnace management, a tendency
which lras very strong in all the Mernber States. the figures given i-n the
teble I illustrate this phenonenon, although they d.o not reflect
it fullyr since they relate only to central governments and. since, at least,
as f,8r as tbo six lhnber States of the ortginal Coomni.ty aro oono€nred., thc
eonsol'icl^atl'on of theilr accourrtg rrith those of, the reg:i.ona.l an4 Loca1 anthorities
and. sooial. sesurity frrnd.e wouLd. show a,n even sharlnr d.eterioratioa.
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2q5 In aLl the lbnber States, expend.lture rosa at alr ertreNllely rapicl
pace, not only because of the add.itional burcLens connected. with the
recession and. the measures taken to combat itr but also as a result of
the stiLl considerable increase, in terme of annral expend.iture, in the
cost of public services. In all the countries, with the exception of
Denmark, the rates of growth of eryend.iture thus exceeded, in some of
them to a considerable extent, the alrea{y very high rates of growth in
L974. Revernre, by contrast, often rose more slowly than in 1974, aIld,
in a nrmber of Member States there was actually no increase at central
government level. Consequently, very consid.erable net borrowing reqtrirem-
ents d.eveloped, in colntries guch as Denmark, Germa"n;r and. the l{etberland.st
where hrd.get maragemenf Ln L974 had prochrced. only snall d.eficitsr or
again in Francet where there had been'a surPlus . ID
Ireland. and. the United. Kingclom, where the initial sitration was alreadlr
one of marked dieequilibriuml bud.get management Ln 1975 oniy strengtbened
the previors tendency towarcLs a growing deficit. In ltalyt tbe worsening
of tbe d.eficit in bqtlget management proper compared wtth tbe alrea{y very
bigh Level of previors years was relativeLy limited., ht there was a mrch
more seriotrs deterioration at the more sigtrificant level of the Treasury
borrowing requirement. In Belgium, where tbe cleficit is trad-itionally
fairly high, the tleterioration of the sitration as compared with the
previors year was less than in the other mernber countries.
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III. &39!gsf-&llgl
3.1o At ths end of, 19?4 noueta,ry poLtoy had begun to be rolaretl ln
see Uenber Stetes and throughout LllJ thls tend.eacy beoanc nore gsneral and
gpduglty nor.c na,rlced,. Eorcwr, tbe il.cgrce of the rcla,:retion antl. itE lnttcrtr
ituriry tho yea,r naricrt betrcen oountr.icg. l[ho ]hber States rhicbl because
of, tbcir balanoc of, pagroeirte aituatton and, lnfilatLon ratesr had nost Ecopc
fon naroqunre were tbe f;lrct to rtetcrul,ne oa neasuras of thls kind'. thi.e ic
ospeelally the oagc for the Fcd.eral Sepnbltc of Getmany anil the fetherland'g.
3.2. |[be tigbtor noncta,rlr polloy Bnrrnreil in the Dbnbcr Stateg in tbe
perloit L973n4 bcgan to blte only after nors or lege Long tine lagr; aloiLarlyl
the Lncreastngly narkeit rela.rgtlon of noneta,rSr pollcy wes unabl.c to prewrt
tbc grradual rorrenJ.ng of tbe eooaroLc situation ln 1975. It roultl aPDearr
tberefore, tbat tbe tlne lt takca for the oaon@y to neslnnd, to ohangrs in
the dtj.rootloa of, nonctartrr polioy is now longer than la tbc past. [hls nalccs
the rcadJustncrrt lrnocort Doro iltffilsutt and. noneta,rXr ooatrol lcsg Inealsc.
3.3. Eorever, tbe caslng of noneta,r;r polioy i.nprnoved. tbc oond.itions for
eoonoi.c rocowr1r. ![he ocntral barks in tbe Connunlty inereas€d, the none-
ta,ry basel slnradigalLy to begtn rtth ln tbe antunn of l)l!,, and. then on a
Larger scale -ihrfng L975. [bi.s Has assocl'ateil rLth a big
rLss Ln bank l|qnfdtlty and a falL in lntersgt rates. Iater in tbe yoarr oon.
i[tions for a rlcovlBrJr ln Bnlnate l.nwgtneut lnprorred.
3o4, the Bund,cebanlc announocd. ln adrnanoe the girorrtb rate tn the none-
tary base atned at f,or 1975t rLile ln Italy the grortb of banlc lcailirg has
been s:nbJeot to ilef;lncrl linits for the Eano y€ar. In otber lbnber States
tbE oentral bankg heve f;trcd glnllar targets for noneta,ry growthr but rather
lees precisely tlef,lncd.
- \e- 9-
3.5. The clisoount rate nas the policy instmnent used. nost frequently for ex-
pansion. In nost l[mber $tates tbe rate r'ras subjected to suoeeeive tnrt nLnor rr
In the United. Kingdon, however, the Sank of Ergl^and.rs niniuum fenai.n$u93tB*'
m,s raised. several times between May ancl October. In France, the Fed.eral
Republic of Gernany and BeLgir:n consid.erable arnounts of bank liquiclity were
released. by cuts in the contrnrlsory reserve ratios. The requirenent that banks
should holiL a proportion of their cleposits in boncts lras ctropped. in Belgiun,
and eased. in ltaly. Ttre quantitative lirnits on the growth of bank lending were
also LiftecL in these two corrntries. h the United. Kingd.om the requirenent
placecl on ba,nks in Decenber lpJJ to nake suppLenentary cleposits with the Bank
of Ergla;rd.r when the increase in their interest-bearing d.eposits exceeded a
certain ratg las discontinuecl in March 1975. On the other hand., the Danish
Nationa} Bank in the final nonths of 1975 absorbed some of the liqtridity
resulting fron the large d.eficit of the public authorities.
3.6. The tencl.ency for liqddity to grow more rapicLLy which !{as apparent in
some Menber States from the beginning of 1975 spread. frorn the surnmer onuard.s
to the vfto1e Community and. has in general continued. since then. h the FederaL
Republic of Gernangrr the Netherland.s ancl the United. Kingd.on it is on\r inperfectly
seen in the growth of noney and. nea:s-rnoney (UZ or M3) since in these countriee
there were najor changes in the relative inporta^nce of near-rnoney a,nd" other
financial assets. fn certain cor:ntries the moae$r supply in the broail sense
(Ue or M3) grew noticeabLy nore slowly than the money supply in the narrow
sense (tUt ). Oe average in the Connr:nity the arunral growth rate of the latter
ras of the order ot 1v/" during the first half-year, rising to about 17% Ln
the autr:sr. In nost Menber States money creation Ln 1975 ves largely cl.eternined.
by the tlenancl for credit of the public authorities. The degree of liguid.ity
in the Menber States at the encl of 1975 rray be regard.ed. as relatively high.
3.7. lItre expansionary monetary pol-icy was
in short-term interest rates, which were a
1975 th.an at the same tine a y@a earlier,
bala,nce of paynents d.eficits moved. toward.s
than those not subject to eerious erbernal
nainly refLected, in a sharp fall
good. d.eal lower at the entl. of
Eowever, the llenber States with
this recluction ruch more cautious\r
constraintg. The faLle in intereet
- 
tr-
10
rates were concentrated. in the first half of the year; subseguently rates
becane virtr:ally stea{Jr.
3.8. tong-tern interest rates fell uuch less tha,n short-term ratest
and. there emerged. a clear margin between them. This revived. the capital
narkets which were swift to take up nell share ancl boncl. issues.
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fV. Exchanse rate policy
4.1 . Despite a striking improvement in the cunent account of the
Comnnity as a whole (fron a deficit ot $ t3 billion in 1974 to a position of
approxinate balance in 1975), and. of nost ind.ividr:aL nenber countries too,
the und.erlyrng tend.ency cluring the year r,'as for Connr:nity currencies to
weaken against the US d.ollar. Ttris trend. can be explained. largely by the
return on the d.ollar beconing relatively more favor:rable as the year prog"essed.,
since the monetary poLicy of the Menber States r'as still aiming at a reduction
in interest ratesr while they began to rise in the UnitetL states. At the
sane tine -the turn-around. in the US balance of palrments ha,s been equally if not
even more spectacular than that of the Comunity,
The four cumencies which participated. in the Coosunity excha.nge
rate system throughout the year clepreciatecl against the cLoLLar by betr,reen l
and B+ per cent d,r:ring 1975t but these figures d.o not neflect the very sub-
stantial fall in these cunencies sinoe the spring. After first rising against
the clollar by about 4 - 5 per cent in January and February, the sr:ake eunencies
then feII steeply by 12 
- 
14 per cent d-uring the renraining ten nonths of the
year. Between January and December 1975 sterling d.epreciatecl by about 14
per cent against the clollar, and the lira by about 5 per cent. Only the !'rench
franc just about rnaintainecl. its val-ue over the year as a whole (-lf").
4.2. Since early in the year Conmrnity central bank-s have been inter-
vening nore actively nrith a vie'r to snoothing out day to d.ay movenents against
the d.ollar. Subseguently, at their neeting on lJ December at Rambouillet, the
head.s of governments of F'rance, the Fecleral Republic of Germargr, Italy, the
-\q/
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Unitetl Kingd.om, Japan and. the United. States agreed to roove firther in this
direction and. to instruet their central banks to intervene in the narkets with
a view to controlling erratic exchange rate movements over a somewhat longer
tine-span. A Conm:nity position on, in particularr the revision of the
guotas of Member States in the International Monetary F\rnd and the problern
of golcL nas reached for the neeting which the fnterin Committee of the IMF
ras to holcl in Janaica at the beginning of 1976.
4.3. the changes in exchange rates of Commrnity omencies on a trad.e-
weighted. basis were substantially smaller than the changes in noninal rates
against the d.olLarr although for most countries they movect in the same d.irec-
tion as noninaL rates (see graph). The two exceptions to this general rule
uere the French franc and the Iira. The forner registered a^n effective
appreciation between the beg:inning and the end of ihe year of 35 per cent.
The latter showed virtually no cha^nge at all over the Xe&rr as a result of
selective intervention by the Banca dtftalia.
4.4. The najor featrrre of the trends in Conmunity cr:nencies roas the
rapid. recovery of the lbench francl lihich cliurbed. back by about 7 /o between
Jarruary and June against the cunencies in the Comnunity exchange rate systen
which it rejoined. on 10 July 1975 after an absence of about one and a haLf
years. ltre position of the lira against the Conmunity currencies scarcely
changecl in 1)lJ, butr by contrast, sterling feIl a further B y'o agai:nst the
average of the other Conurxrity cumencies.
4.5. The comnunity exchange rate system !{as not subject to pressure
cluring 1975. Intervention in Community currencies to naintain then within the
2.2J per cent nargin uas rnrch Less exteneive tha^n in prewious years, and. indleed.
during the Last five nonths of 1975 there was no intervention. Ttre inproved,
cohesion of the snake cu*encieg @ne fron. a cLoser convergence of_ econonic
poLiciee betweea the nenber oountries together with a policy of nore active
intervention in doLlars.
3€sitles the enLa.rgement of, the Cornuunity erobange rate systen,
chalrg€s rere introcluced. reLating in particnlar to thE autonatic rcneral of,
itobts and the nethod.s of settlenent. Xn add.ition, after the Counoil authorlzed.
tbe m,les for the pl.acing of Coonunity loans to flna,nce tbe bal,ance of palnents
tleflcits of lbnber $tates, the Connission sta.rted, negotietions f,or the isflre
of an initial loanr.
-\b-
13
4.6. There E.s very 1itt1e change in the Commrnityrs total official
foreign exchange reserves d.r:ring the year although there were significant
shifts in reserves between nember countries. The Unitecl Kingd.on, Italy and
the FecLeral Republic of Oernany were obligecl. to draw on their reserves to
support their currencies, urhile the French authorities ad.ded. substantially
to their hoLd.ings of foreign currency by bu.ying d.ollars in the foreign exchange
market.
-\b-
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5.1. llhe generaLly expansionary guitlelines for clenand. nanagpnent policy
haregiven a greater nobin 1975 fo incomes policy in the controlLing of cost
push inflation. As the close link between inflation and rurenplo;rnent beca,ne
nore clearly recognised., interventions in the incones poLicy area a,nd coopera-
tion between the two sid.eg of inclustry inproved.
5.2. The measures introduced. to restrain the rise in personal incornes
cane up against nanlr d.ifficulties. The d.ivitlend. controLs inposed. in the UnitecL
Kingdon ancl the changes in direct ta.:cation introduoecL in the Fed.eral Republic
of Gennanyl Denmark and. Irelancl did., however, create nore favourable cond.itions
for a slow'ingdoun in $rag€s. In general, it uas evid.ently not possible, either
in the private sector or the public sector, to achieve a sufficient slowingr
d.own in the increase in noninal pay; in aclclition, in view of the fall in produc-
tion, the pressure of uage oosts llas necessarily stronger in 1975 (eee TabLeg 3
and 4). Itt the Fed.eral Reptrblio of Oernarqr the consensus achieved. between
the social partners resultetl in a nore mod.erate d.evelopnent in salarieg alxd
prices rrithout d.irect intervention by the authorities. Ia the other l{enber
Statesr the regults of the measuree ad.opteil in 1975 to linit the rige in
salarieE were not imed.iate or simiLar. In the UnitecL Kingd.on as in Dennark
where the incLexatioa system ras noclifieil in a :restrictive d.irection, the measures
hatl a narked. effect on inflation. In ftaly and. Lu.xenbourg, on the other hand,
the inclexation system lras wiclenecl ia 1975.
5.3' Fbrther neasures were taken to assist the lowest paid.. Social
security benefits were increased. in nost of the conntrieg; oltl age pensionsr-
inter al.iar were raieed in the lletherland.s, the Fed,eral Republic of Gernargr and
Ilancer and. were indered. in ftaly. Sinilarly, mininum gJages were increased
and unenploSrnent benefits read.jueted., in particuLar by extencling the ra,nge of
those eligibler by lengthening the compensation periods and. by raising the
anounts paid.. Iastly measures were taken to protect snall Ba.vcrs by inderationt
in pe.rtioular in thc tlnitcil Kirgd.m and. Xrela,nd..
--\t* 15
5.4. In ad.dition to efforts carriecl out in the incones policy field.r the
authoritie€r were led. to act d.irectly on the leve1 of prices in the rnajority
of Menber Stateg. A ra,nge of measures ln.s involved., fron the control of
prioes of a linited. number of goocls and. services (ftafy a,nd. Luxenbourg), to a
general price freeze, such as was introduced. in Belg'inm in May 1975 and
graduaLly eased. thereafter. A freeze on profit nargins was introduced in
trbance a,nd Denm,rk; and in this latter conntry, and. also in frela,nd, the
gra^nt.ing of subsi&ies and tenporary reduatione in r,'alue ad.cled tax were also
used as pa"rt of prices policy. Ir the Uniteel. Kingd.on and the lletherlancls,
where the nonitoring of prices hatl renained. very strict, Bome relaxation of
oontrol-s was introduced. dnring the year, ee1rccialLy Bo aa to safeguarit private
investslent. A Linitecl number of countries, a^ncl in lnrticular the Federal.
Republic of Gernar5rr refrained. fron all dlirect intervention in price fornation.
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B. CONVERqfi{CE OF ECOIIOMIC POLICIES IN TTIIE COMMI.INIIY
Vf. Application of the Council Decision of 18 Februanr 1974
6.1. The Council Decision of 18 Febrr:ary 1974 on the attainment of a
high d.egree of convergence of the econonic poLicies of the l,Iember States of
the Comrunity provid.es for a number of fixecL period.s and consulta*,ion and.
examination procedures whose obserrration is assessed. in the followlng.
6.2. fn application of Article 1, the Council regularly examined. the
econornic situation and aclopted. guiclelines on economic policy in the Corun:nity
at a total of eight rneetingsl in 1)lJ. Ttre economic a,nd social sitr:ation in
the Connunity las d.iscussed. at each of the three meetings of the European)Cor:ncil-. FiraallXr at two meetings helcl in the autunrr, the Ministers for Finance
of the Mernber States drew up a common position in preparation for the inter"-
national nonetary conferences. The Menber States belonging to the tfsnaketf
net on a nunber of occasions for consultation, at r''hich the other Comuunity
countries were not present. i
In Novenber, the Ministers for Econonic Affairs and for Emplo;runent,
the Connission and. representatives of the two sid.es of industry net for the
first tine ancl. had. ful1 and. frank d.iscussions on the economic and. social
situation in the Connunity and on the firture outlobk.
5.3. Ttre exa,nination provid.ecl for in Article 2 took place cluring the
first gr,rarter at the Cor:ncil neeting helcL on 18 March. The d.ecision on the
ad.justment of the economic policy guid.elines vras not finally ad.opted r:ntil
16 June.
The second examination, proviclecl for in Artiole ] , took place at the
Council meeting held. on 10 July on the basis pf a commurnication from the Com-
nission on the economic policy to be pursued. in 1975 and on the drawing up of
the public budgets for 1!J6. ft provecl difficult to fix qr:antitative guide-
lines for the clraft public butlgets, because of the r:ncertain economic outlook
1D"t"" of neetings: 1J February, 18 March,
1O JuIy, 22 Septenber a^nd. 1J November.
2
-European Council: 11 antL 12 March. 15 antl
21 ApriL, 20 May, 15 June,
17 JuIv. 1 arrd. 2 Deeember.
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in the spring of 1)lJ.
Because of the lack of ad.eqr:ate information on economic trend.s
up to the summer, it was not until the mid.cLle of October that the Connission
presented. the annual report on the eeonornic situation in the Commrnity
fixing the guicLelines to be folLowed by each Mernber State in its economic
policy for the fol^lowing year, though these vrere sched.ulecL for the end. of
the thircl quarter und.er Article 4. The annual report and. the guicLeLines
were adoptecL by the Cowrcil in Novernberl.
Ttre Comrnission intends to present l?re d,raft of the annuaL r6port
for LTl6 in Septenber this year once again, so that it can be taken into sssquntin
the butLgetary d.ebates in the national parliaments.
6.4. Ttre d.raft of bhe fourth rned.iunr-term economic policy prog"anme
for the Comnunity is at present being prepared, and it will be presented
to the Council before the summer.
4tr. As provid.ed. for in Article J, the prior consultation on exchange
rate alterations r^;as observed. nhen the Fbench franc returned. to the Cornrn:nity
exchange ratd system. The consultations on the strengthening of coopera-
tion between the central banks of the Member States, with the aim of promoting
the continuaL coortl.ination of their monetary policies, especially as regard.s
the d.eveLopment of the noney supply and bank liquidityl tlre cond.itions for
granting cred.it and the level of interest rates, take place regularly with:.:r
the franework of the Comnittee of the Governors of the Central Banks axrcl
the lvloneiary Conmittee.
1
'See 0J C 297 of 2) Decenber lpJl
-2b-18
. 5.6. In the sta,ntl.ing conEultations on the general econonic policy rneasures
envisaged. by the Menber States a,nd. on their confornity w:ith the econonic
. polioy guiclelineor the Coorclinating Comittee on Short-Tsrn Econonic and
I'inanciaL Policies largely confinecl itself to an exchange of infornation on
econonic developnents in the menber countnies. Prior coneultatione have
onJ.y taken plaoe in a linited. nunber of cages.
-)\- -19-
VII. Conformity of the policies pursued with the ob.'iectives set. and succegs
qf 
_the efforts at coordi
7 .r. In the first Report on the Application of the Council Decision of
18 l'ebruary L974t the Comnission stressed that the coordination of economic
policies 1n L974 had been insufficient and regretted the fact that in the
surplus and d.eficit countries the necessary measures had been und.ertaken
with a lack of whole-heartedness a^nd had achieved only limited. effectiveness(I).
In view of the najor disequilibria existing within the Cornnunity a^nd the
uncertain outlook for world trade, there was ttno reason to expect that production
will start rising again in the Connunity countries before the autnnn (fgZ5)"(e).
However, the decline in economic growth proved. sharper in the first half of the
year than expected, since export denand in all the menber countries felI
drastically. In the Reconnenda,tion of 23 JuIy L)lJ concerning the measures
to combat the recession, the Comrnission asked. the tr'ederal Rep ublic of Germa,r5r,
the Senelux countries, France and., to a lesser extent, Dennark and Italy to
take add.itional measures to stimulate the econony and reduce nnenplo;ment.
In August and Septenber 1975, five Mernber States; particularly France and the
trbderal Republic of Ge:margr, decided. to ad.opt extensive short-term economic
policy progr€uilres, which were closely coordinatecl as to content ancl tining
and. wtrioh were al-so a.nnonnced. at about the sane period..
'1.2. Monetary and cred.it poLicy in 1975 was almost generally along expan-
sionary lines. The effects beca,ne apparent only in the subseguent trend of
economic activity and. reirforced the inpetus of the built-in grorth of bud.get
deficits and public bud.get prog?€umes. The greater convergence of monetary
a^nd bud.getary efforts in the Connr:nity strengthened. nonetary cohesion. With
the exception of the por:ntl sterling and the ftalian 1irr, the excbange rates
(1) neport on the Application of the Council Decision
para. 2.1. (d.oc. COM (?5) 93 tinar/Z)
(e) Cmnission Cmmwrication to the Council concerning
econonic policy guicielines for 1975t 0 J L 162/13
of 18 Febn:ary I974t
the ad.justnent of the
of 25 june 1/fl, Para.l.).
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of the Menber States drew closer togethex up to the erdof the year. With
the returre of the French franc j.nto the Connunity exchange ra,te systern, the
area of nonetary policy stabillty in the Comnr:nity was enlarged. once again.
7.3. In ltlarch I975r as a r€sult of the rapid. success achieved. in reducing
its balance of pagrments deficitl ltaly r*as able to lift the cash deposit
requirenents for inports which had been introduced the previous year. The
nonetazy and budgetary polioy ceilingsr which were inposed., on ftaly in connec-
tion with the gra^nting of ned.irn-te::n assistance for L975\1*""e"8*8!gAmbl|
particular\r torard.s the end of the year, nainly because the econonic d.own-
swins proved nuch sharper tha,n 
"=p""t"/.""*"*3?3??it3:"$"8:igtl?t9"{"ffi?ot3"'
nrled. out that, amongst otber factors, the exceeding of these ceiling contri-
bruted. to the faII in the value of the lira in Janr:a,ry 1975.
7.4. llhe United Kingdorn and lreland were at first hesitant in following
the restrictive econonic policies provicled for in the Comr:nity guid.elines,
as is shown in the rapid rise per capita in nages and unit
labour costs (tatte 3 anct4 ). It nas not until later in the recession that
energetic incomes policy neasures were taken to reduce price and cost pressure,
so as to counteract the rapid. worserri.ng of the balance of pa;ments a,nd
inflation.
Tbe inpovuent in the aoonmLo situatlon sc@s to hsrrc been
clearegt in those corxrtries wh:ich responded. nost rapid.ly and nost
6
t
vigorously
the twoto the nutrerous calls for voluntary
sides of industry.
cooperation between
The Tripartite Conference held in Novcnber L)IJ, at which the
lfinisters for Economic a,nd. Social Affairs and, the Coronission and the two sid.es
of inclustry net, ras an inporta,nt basis for developing the exchange of id.eas
on the short a^nd. ncdiru-tct'm problens facing all the Cornuurnity countries,
which can onl;r be solved on a Connunity basis a,nd through cooperation.
(t) Counoil Dtrsctive of l"? Decenber 1974 on the
fina^ncial assistance to ltaLy.
OJ L 34I/JL of 20 Decenbet L)l{.
granting of ned.iun-te::m
-zh-
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7.5, fhe success of the efforts at coordination r:ndertaken witbin the
Counrnity cannot be neasured sinply by the nr:mber of Council, comittee or
working party neetings, nor sinply by the result of the overall econornic
trend. in the fo:m of conparisons of anrnral average figures. 1975 llas not
on\r a year of marked unfavourable tendencies. The inprovenent in thc external
trade disequilibria within the Comnunity a,nd 
- 
in the second. balf of the year 
-
also in the internaL econonic situa,tion r.'ras notewort$r and can without doubt
be attributed to the nore vigorous short-te:s econmic policy efforts undertaJccn
by the nember cotrntries at Conrnurrity and international levcl.
7.6. All the d.eficit countries, particularly ltaly a,nd. Erance, were able
to reduce their current account deficits as a result of a sharp decline ip
imports. The total deficit of these countries was I 5roo0 nillion 
"t t#3"[T/
Oa the other hancl, the Fecleral Republic of Gerrnarrlr naintainect a higtt Level of
inports despite a d.ecline i-n econmic activity and was able to reduce its
current accoutrt suzplus by two-third.s to alnost $ 3 000 nillion as conpared
with the previous year.
7.7. The reduction in tnflation rates d.uring the year became particular\r
distinct during the eecond. half of the year in all the member countries except
for Belgiumr Luxenbourg and the Netherlands. Unit labour costs, which have
gone on rising and have accelerated. in alnost alL the Menber States except
Dennark and the Fed.eral Republic of Ge:ma.qrr 4r€ a carrse for concern (see
Table 3 ). These tendencies have been reversed on\r in the last few
nonths in the United. Kingd.on a,nd Ireland. as a result of the prices a.nd incones
policies introduced.
7.8. The d.ornward trend. in industrial prod.uction bottmecl. out a^fter the
suuDer and prod.uction has since then begun to r.ecorrer tn most of the member
corrrtries. At the end of l)lJ, all the Connunity countries except Luxembotug,
Belgiun a,nd. the United Kingdonrhad. either zegained or indeed. exceeded the level
of the previous year. The labour narket situation, which usually reacts to
the recovery of econmic activity with a time lag is
alrcaSr improving in some countries, if seasonal influences are disregarded.
-{
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The climate of confid.ence a&ong consumers and.
TLre ehances of a general recovery in econonic
grorbh are becoming nore favourable.
firms is inproving stead.ily.
activity and of sustained.
23
CCFICLIJSIONS
Although the coordination of eoononio policiee between lfenber States
stiLl leaves a Lot to be d.esired.s sone progreEs hae been realised' in thig
respeot as comparetl with the previous y@r. Inflatiornary trend's easedr &is-
equiLibrium in the baLa,nce of lnJments ilas reducecl surprislngly rapitllyr a'ncll
flnaLly, the likel.ihootl. and. incteetL the baeis for a new upswing ln the econonlc
gitn"ation have inproved ooneicLerably. Cooperation between ltlenber Stateg at
Ehropean ancl interrrationaL level haE without tl.oubt helped. to cheok the recession
quiclcly anct to set off a recover1r in tlenand a,nd procluction. Emeverr it has
not been possible to holct baok the worrying increaee in rr,aeraplo;nnent ' Besides,
although the tllvergencies in the cl.eveJ-opent of infl.ation ratea and. balanoEe
o? palments bave leseenod in the Comrurityr clifferenoes gtill persist.
Tlre nain probl.ens for 1976 wiLL be to eecure stea{y grorth nithout
grvipg a further push to inflationr md to reduce the high Level of unenploy-
nent. It wilL be posslbl.e to see fron the approach adopted to these problens
to what ertent the great rillingness to cooperate wtrich has been shorn by
governnents and. the two siates of industry is due to a lasting recognition of
their nltrral interclepend.ence rather than to the pressures from the nogt serious
recession since the rer.
-L8 -
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